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DOES MONITORING IMPROVE 
LABOR STANDARDS?  LESSONS FROM NIKE
RICHARD M. LOCKE, FEI QIN, and ALBERTO BRAUSE*
Using a unique data set based on factory audits of working conditions in over 800 
of Nike’s suppliers across 51 countries over the years 1998–2005, the authors explore 
whether monitoring for compliance with corporate codes of conduct—currently the 
principal way both global corporations and labor rights non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) address poor working conditions in global supply chain factories—achieved 
remediation, as indicated by improved working conditions and stepped-up enforce-
ment of labor rights.  Despite substantial efforts and investments by Nike and its staff 
to improve working conditions among its suppliers, monitoring alone appears to have 
produced only limited results.  However, when monitoring efforts were combined with 
other interventions focused on tackling some of the root causes of poor working condi-
tions—in particular, by enabling suppliers to better schedule their work and to improve 
quality and efficiency—working conditions seem to have improved considerably.
*Richard M. Locke is the Alvin J. Siteman (1948) 
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Science in the Sloan School of Management at Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology; Fei Qin received her 
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1See Collier and Dollar (2002) and Moran (2002) for 
more on the positive potential of globalization.
lobalization, with its volatile mix of eco-
nomic opportunity and social disrup-
tion, has provoked a fierce debate over 
working conditions and labor rights in 
developing countries.  On the one hand, 
foreign direct investment and the diffusion of 
global supply chains in an array of different 
industries—apparel, electronics, footwear, 
toys, and so on—have provided developing 
countries much-needed capital, employ-
ment, technology, and access to international 
markets.  Seen in this light, globalization is 
having a catalytic and transformative effect 
on local economies, allowing poor countries 
to finally achieve their long sought-after 
goal of development.1  On the other hand, 
global corporations and their local suppliers 
are depicted as agents of exploitation, tak-
ing advantage of developing countries’ low 
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wages and weak social and environmental 
regulation to produce low-cost goods at the 
expense of the local workers’ welfare.  Nu-
merous reports have described exploitative 
working conditions in global supply chain 
plants.  Workers are paid only a few dollars 
and required to work excessive hours, often 
in poorly lit and unsafe conditions.2
In the wake of several well-publicized 
scandals involving child labor, hazardous 
working conditions, excessive working hours, 
and poor wages in factories supplying major 
global brands, multinational corporations 
have developed their own “codes of conduct”3
as well as a variety of “monitoring” mecha-
nisms aimed at enforcing compliance with 
these codes.  In fact, given the limited ability 
of many developing country governments to 
enforce their own laws,4 monitoring for com-
pliance with codes of conduct is currently the 
principal way both global corporations and 
labor rights non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) address poor working conditions 
in global supply chain factories.  The logic 
behind this model of “private, voluntary 
regulation” is that monitoring should provide 
information useful both to consumer groups 
seeking to exert market pressure on global 
brands and to these same brands so that they 
can pressure their suppliers to improve fac-
tory conditions.
Given their widespread use, how effective 
are these monitoring systems?  Aside from 
providing information about working condi-
tions in various global supply chain factories, 
does this system actually promote change in 
working conditions?  In other words, does 
monitoring lead to remediation in terms of 
improved working conditions and enforced 
labor rights?  If so, under what conditions? 
Using a unique data set based on factory 
audits of working conditions in over 800 of 
Nike’s suppliers in 51 countries,5 in this paper 
we seek to address those questions.
We build on the results presented in this 
paper, together with more intensive case study 
data collected as part of this project (Locke 
and Romis 2007), to suggest a reframing of the 
debate and the approach to monitoring and 
improving labor standards in global supply 
chains.  We suggest that what is needed is a 
more systemic approach, one combining ex-
ternal (countervailing) pressure (be it from 
the state, or unions, or labor-rights NGOs) 
with comprehensive, transparent monitoring 
systems and a variety of “management sys-
tems” interventions aimed at eliminating the 
root causes of poor working conditions.
We first present a highly synthetic review 
of the major debates about monitoring, and 
then provide background on the athletic 
footwear industry in general and Nike, Inc. 
in particular.  The core empirical analysis 
following those preliminaries addresses three 
questions.  First, how bad (or good) are work-
ing conditions among Nike’s various suppli-
ers?  Second, what determines variation in 
working conditions among these suppliers? 
(In other words, what accounts for the greatly 
differing working conditions across factories 
producing more or less the same products 
for the same brand?)  And third, are work-
ing conditions improving over time in these 
factories?  We conclude by pondering the 
broader implications of our findings for the 
more general debates over labor standards 
in a global economy.
Monitoring:  A Review of the Debates
Corporate codes of conduct and various 
efforts aimed at monitoring compliance with 
these codes have been around for decades. 
Whereas monitoring efforts began by empha-
sizing corporate or supplier compliance with 
national regulations and laws, over time they 
2See, for example, Verité (2004), Pruett (2005), and 
Connor and Dent (2006).
3For a good description of this movement, see Jenkins 
(2001), Schrage (2004), and Mamic (2004).
4For more on this, see Baccaro (2001) and Elliot and 
Freeman (2003).
5This paper is part of a larger project organized by 
Richard Locke on globalization and labor standards.  In 
addition to the data analyses presented in this paper, 
the research entailed field research in China, Turkey, 
Mexico, Europe, and the United States as well as over 
200 interviews with factory managers, workers, NGO 
representatives, union leaders, and Nike managers 
(both in the United States and abroad).  We thank 
the other project participants—Jonathan Rose, Jen-
nifer Andrews, Dinsha Mistree, Rushan Jiang, Monica 
Romis, and Alonso Garza—for their helpful comments 
throughout the project.
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have increasingly focused on compliance with 
private, voluntary codes of conduct.  More-
over, if at first corporate codes were centered 
on redressing power imbalances between 
multinational corporations and developing 
countries, or on promoting “transparency” 
(in other words, preventing bribery), in-
creasingly they have come to focus on the 
impact of globalization on labor and the 
environment.6  Much of the recent literature 
on monitoring and other forms of “private 
voluntary regulation” focuses on either the 
particularities surrounding the actual process 
of monitoring (that is, how these inspections 
are conducted, by whom, for what purposes) 
or on the relationship between these regula-
tory efforts and other forms of regulation, 
especially state regulation.
Critics of voluntary monitoring regimes 
argue that they “crowd out” more thorough 
government and union interventions and 
are designed not to protect labor rights or 
improve working conditions but instead to 
limit the legal liability of global brands and 
prevent damage to their reputation (Esben-
shade 2004).  Far from protecting workers, 
these monitoring schemes eviscerate state 
regulation and undermine union power with-
out replacing them with a viable alternative 
regime.  Others, however, argue that private 
monitoring is not an attempt to undermine 
the state but rather an appropriately flexible 
response to the reality of global production 
networks and the low capacity of developing 
country states to fully enforce labor laws and 
regulations (Nadvi and Wältring 2004).  Ac-
cording to this second group, under certain 
conditions, the monitoring efforts of brands, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives, and NGOs can 
work to strengthen government enforcement 
of national laws, particularly when states lack 
the capacity or the resources to carry out 
systematic factory inspections (Bartley 2005; 
Fung et al. 2001; O’Rourke 2003; Rodriguez-
Garavito 2005).
A second debate over monitoring focuses 
on whether those conducting the audits can 
be trusted to make accurate and honest as-
sessments of factory conditions and transpar-
ently report their findings.  Critics identify 
a number of important conflicts of interest 
that exist among the key actors involved in 
the monitoring process (National Research 
Council 2004; Esbenshade 2004; Pruett 2005; 
Rodriguez-Garavito 2005).  Given that brands 
and their suppliers may have an interest in 
hiding labor violations rather than reporting 
them, how trustworthy are these internal 
audits?  Might not the moral hazard for these 
interested parties be too great?  Nor does 
auditing by “third party” organizations escape 
observers’ skeptical regard.  If the third par-
ties are NGOs, how competent are they in as-
sessing certain technical issues (for example, 
air quality)?  If, instead, private monitoring 
firms are the third-party auditors, how forth-
coming will they be, given that they probably 
hope to please their clients (the brands and 
their suppliers, who pay for these services) 
and generate future business?  In response 
to these criticisms, various procedures and 
policies were established to promote greater 
transparency and oversight by “independent” 
organizations.  Increasingly, external audi-
tors, ranging from for-profit social auditing 
companies to local NGOs, are being certified 
by Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) like 
the Fair Labor Association and the Fair Wear 
Foundation.  These institutional mechanisms 
are meant to bolster the creditability of 
monitors.  Still, some observers (for example, 
the Worker Rights Consortium) argue that 
monitoring must be completely independent 
of brands and factories in order to be truly 
effective.
A third debate concerns the growing 
number and diversity of codes of conduct 
and auditing protocols as well as the uneven 
quality7 of the audits being performed.  The 
diversity of codes and monitoring schemes 
being applied to global suppliers is well docu-
mented (Brown 2005a, 2005b; Jenkins 2001; 
O’Rourke 2003).  Underlying these different 
codes and implementation systems are very 
different principles and goals.  Whereas some 
6For an interesting historical review of corporate 
codes of conduct and their evolution over time, see 
Jenkins (2001).  Another interesting historical parallel 
can be found in Seidman (2003).
7For a critique of existing auditing practices, see 
Pruett (2005).
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codes emphasize freedom of association and 
anti-discrimination policies, others instead 
focus on “living” (as opposed to minimum) 
wages, “excessive” work hours, and health 
and safety issues.  Some codes are monitored 
by internal, company staff while others are 
audited by third-party, external consultants 
or NGOs.
Less is known, however, about the overall 
impact of multiple codes of conduct and 
monitoring strategies on factories and on 
the workers employed within them.  A 2003
World Bank study estimated that over 1,000 
corporate codes of conduct existed in that 
year (Smith and Feldman 2003:2).  Many 
suppliers have to implement multiple codes 
of conduct, which causes inefficiency and 
confusion.  Some factories complain of 
“monitoring fatigue,” given that they are 
monitored multiple times a year on behalf of 
each of the global brands they work for.  In 
addition, suppliers complain of being placed 
in “compliance limbo” between different and 
conflicting code requirements.  Our inter-
views in the field revealed that many codes 
of conduct are accompanied by increasingly 
detailed guides, specifying, for example, the 
exact position of fire extinguishers or the ra-
tio of toilets to employees.  The result is that 
the suppliers have to arrange and rearrange 
things—move fire extinguishers back and 
forth between locations, for example—as dif-
ferent auditors for different brands perform 
plant inspections.  Similar problems can oc-
cur with specifications for bottom-up worker 
involvement, which can differ from code to 
code, creating redundant systems.
A related criticism concerns the mixed 
quality of the audits and level of skill or 
experience of the auditors.  Although some 
monitors are experienced professionals with 
training in various production and labor-re-
lated functions, many others are recent col-
lege graduates whose primary qualification is 
either speaking a particular foreign language 
or possessing great passion for labor rights 
(Esbenshade 2004; Pruett 2005).  Monitor-
ing protocols vary tremendously in terms of 
issues being investigated (wages, work hours, 
working conditions, child labor, freedom of 
association, health and safety issues, sexual 
harassment, and so on), methodology em-
ployed to collect information (for example, 
interviews—with or without workers, on-site 
or away from the factory—documents, ob-
servations), length of time spent conducting 
the audit, level of skill or experience of the 
monitors, and methods of reporting the in-
formation collected (Jenkins 2001; O’Rourke 
2003).  Given this marked diversity in in-
spection protocols and auditors, the room 
for controversy over whose audit protocol 
is more thorough or more accurate or even 
truly independent is enormous.
The ability to collect accurate information 
about a facility and report it in a transparent 
manner is only one of many key requirements 
for upholding and improving labor standards. 
Because the debates over monitoring are so 
polarized, revolving around stark choices 
about what gets monitored, who does it, and 
how it gets done, the question of whether 
monitoring is an effective strategy for improv-
ing labor standards has not been adequately 
evaluated.8  That question is the focus of our 
paper.  But to provide for a better understand-
ing of our findings, especially in light of the 
above debates, the next section presents some 
industry- and company-level context.
Context:  Nike and the 
Athletic Footwear Industry
The athletic footwear industry has expe-
rienced explosive growth over the past two 
decades.  In 1985, consumers in the United 
States alone spent $5 billion and purchased 
250 million pairs of shoes (Korzeniewicz 
1994).  In 2004, they spent almost $15 billion 
and bought over 370 million pairs of shoes 
(National Sporting Goods Association 2005). 
Although the industry is highly segmented—
by different sports, models, and price—the 
branded shoe segment is dominated by a few 
large companies.  Nike, Reebok, and Adidas 
account for almost 60% of the global ath-
letic footwear market (Petrecca and Howard 
2005).  Since displacing Adidas and Reebok 
in the 1980s, Nike has become the largest and 
most important athletic shoe company in the 
8Noted exceptions include two studies on monitoring 
practices in the U.S. garment industry.  See Esbenshade 
(2004, Chap. 3) and Weil (2005).
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world.  Even after the recent merger between 
Reebok and Adidas, Nike still controls over 
36% of the U.S. athletic shoe market and over 
33% of the global athletic footwear market 
(Petrecca and Howard 2005).
Founded as Blue Ribbon Sports (BRS) 
in 1964 by Phil Knight and Bill Bowerman, 
each of whom invested $500 for its start-up, 
the company has evolved from an importer 
and distributor of Japanese specialty running 
shoes to the world leader in the design, distri-
bution, and marketing of athletic footwear.
According to company legend, Nike’s busi-
ness model was developed by Knight while 
he attended Stanford Business School in the 
early 1960s.  Knight realized that while lower-
cost, high-quality Japanese producers were 
beginning to take over the U.S. consumer 
appliance and electronics markets, most 
leading footwear companies (for example, 
Reebok and Converse) were still manufactur-
ing their own shoes in higher-cost countries 
like the United States.  By designing and 
marketing high-performance athletic shoes 
in the United States but outsourcing pro-
duction to lower-cost Japanese producers, 
Knight believed that Blue Ribbon Sports 
could undersell its competitors and break 
into this market.  As a result, Blue Ribbon 
Sports began to import high-tech sports 
shoes from Onitsuka Tiger of Japan.  As sales 
increased to almost $2 million in the early 
1970s, BRS parted ways with Onitsuka.  The 
Nike brand was launched in 1972, and the 
company officially changed its name to Nike, 
Inc. in 1978.
Nike developed a strong working relation-
ship with two Japanese shoe manufacturers, 
Nippon Rubber and Nihon-Koyo, but as 
costs increased in Japan during the 1970s 
(due to a combination of a tighter labor 
market, the impact of the first Oil Crisis on 
Japan’s economy, and a shift in the dollar/
yen exchange rate as a result of the so-called 
“Nixon shock”),9 Nike began to search for 
alternative, lower-cost producers.  During 
these same years, Nike opened up its own 
shoe factories in Maine and New Hampshire, 
hoping to develop a reliable local source to 
supply its growing domestic market.  At the 
same time, the company also began to culti-
vate potential suppliers in Korea, Thailand, 
China, and Taiwan.  By the mid-1980s, as 
costs continued to increase in both Japan 
and the United States, and as the Korean 
government created a number of incentives 
to develop Korea’s footwear industry,10 Nike 
closed its U.S. factories and sourced almost 
all of its production from Asia.  By 1982, 86% 
of Nike’s athletic footwear came from Korea 
and Taiwan.11
Over time, as Korea and Taiwan also be-
gan to develop, costs began to rise in these 
countries as well.  As a result, Nike began to 
urge its suppliers to re-locate their operations 
to other, lower-cost countries.  The company 
worked with its lead suppliers to open up 
manufacturing plants in Indonesia, China, 
and Vietnam.  By guaranteeing abundant or-
ders and by placing Nike employees at these 
new factories to help monitor product quality 
and production processes, Nike was able to 
help its lead vendors establish an extensive 
network of footwear factories throughout 
Southeast Asia.
By 2004, Nike’s products were manu-
factured in more than 800 factories in 51 
countries, employing over 600,000 workers. 
Nike has only 24,291 direct employees, the 
vast majority working in the United States 
(Nike 2005:3–4).  Over the years, Nike has 
broadened its product range.  Whereas in 
1980 it sold 175 different styles12 of shoes, it 
offered 772 different styles in its Spring 1990 
collection and almost 1,200 different styles 
in its Spring 2000 collection.13  Nike has also 
moved into other sectors (apparel and sports 
equipment) and expanded its sales beyond 
the United States into Europe, Latin America, 
and Asia.  In 2004, the company made about 
9For more on these years, see Murukami (1987).
10These and other government incentive programs 
are nicely described in Amsden (1989).
11For more on the evolution of Nike’s strategy, see 
Christensen and Rikert (1984); Rosenzweig (1994); and 
Strasser and Becklund (1991).
12This includes different color combinations of 
shoes.
13These figures come from various Nike catalogues. 
We thank Jody McFarland for helping us obtain these 
data.
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US$12.2 billion in revenues, of which $6.5 
billion came from footwear sales and $3.5 
billion from apparel (Nike 2005:2).
Important differences exist among the sec-
tors in which Nike competes.  Although it is 
still primarily known as a footwear company, 
only 70 of its 830 suppliers are producing 
shoes.  Most of these suppliers are located 
in Asia.  In contrast, Nike apparel products 
are manufactured in 576 factories distributed 
throughout the world (Nike 2005:4).  These 
differences are due both to the rules govern-
ing international trade in the two industries 
and to the underlying nature of these indus-
tries (footwear factories are usually large, 
capital-intensive facilities, whereas garment 
factories are usually smaller, easy-to-establish, 
and extremely labor-intensive operations). 
Whereas footwear quotas were eliminated 
by the mid-late 1980s (leading to a consoli-
dation of the industry), trade in garments 
was until January 2005 very much shaped 
by the existence of quotas (the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement).  Still today, various tariffs 
and “voluntary” export restrictions between 
China and both the European Union and the 
United States have prevented the formation 
of a truly “free market” in garments.14
These industry differences strongly con-
dition the kinds of relationships that Nike 
can develop with its various suppliers.  For 
example, in footwear, Nike has been able to 
develop long-term relations with several large 
Korean and Taiwanese firms.  When Nike 
designers create new footwear designs and 
styles for upcoming seasons, this informa-
tion is relayed via satellite to some of these 
partnering suppliers, who, in turn, develop 
the prototypes.  Once these prototypes are 
approved, these lead suppliers fax the product 
specifications to their various plants through-
out Southeast Asia, where production can 
take place almost immediately.  This level 
of trust and coordination facilitates both 
production and (presumably) compliance 
activities for Nike.  In apparel, given short 
product cycles and volatile fashion trends, the 
situation is completely different.  Nike works 
with numerous suppliers, most of whom are 
also producing apparel in the same factories 
for other (often competitor) companies. 
Because of the tendency of different apparel 
suppliers to specialize in particular products 
or market segments, together with the rapid-
ity of shifts in consumer preferences or fash-
ion trends, Nike sometimes enters into very 
short-term contracts with these companies 
or places very limited orders with them (or 
both).  The result is diminished influence on 
these suppliers and, in particular, diminished 
ability to regularly monitor the production 
processes and working conditions at the sup-
pliers’ factories.
The same strategies that permitted Nike to 
grow at an impressive rate over the past several 
decades—taking advantage of global sourcing 
opportunities to produce lower-cost products 
and investing these savings in innovative de-
signs and marketing campaigns—have also 
created serious problems for the company 
in recent years.  As early as the 1980s, Nike 
was being criticized for sourcing its products 
in factories and countries where low wages, 
poor working conditions, and human rights 
problems were rampant.  Then, over the 
course of the 1990s, a series of public relations 
nightmares—involving underpaid workers 
in Indonesia, child labor in Cambodia and 
Pakistan, and poor working conditions in 
China and Vietnam—combined to tarnish 
Nike’s image.  As Phil Knight lamented in a 
May 1998 speech to the National Press Club, 
“The Nike product has become synonymous 
with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbi-
trary abuse.”15
At first, Nike managers took a defensive 
position when confronted with the various 
labor, environmental, and occupational 
health problems found at their suppliers’ 
plants.  Workers at these factories were 
not Nike employees, and thus Nike felt no 
responsibility toward them.  By 1992, this 
hands-off approach changed as Nike formu-
lated its Code of Conduct for its suppliers 
that required them to observe some basic 
labor, environmental, and health and safety 
standards.  (See Appendix 1 for the most 
14See Brown (2005a) for more on these issues.
15Detail about these events can be found in Locke 
(2003).
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recent version of Nike’s Code of Conduct.) 
All suppliers—current and potential—are 
obligated to sign this Code of Conduct and 
post it within their factories.  Since 1998, 
Nike has increased the minimum age for 
footwear factory workers to 18 and for all 
other workers (apparel and equipment) to 
16.  It has also insisted that all footwear sup-
pliers adopt U.S. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) standards 
for indoor air quality.
To enforce compliance with its code of 
conduct, Nike has conducted numerous 
training sessions with its suppliers as well as 
assembled a team of 90 compliance staff based 
in 21 countries, to monitor these suppliers.16 
In addition to these compliance specialists, 
Nike has about 1,000 production specialists 
working at or with its various global suppli-
ers.  All Nike personnel responsible for either 
production or compliance receive training 
in Nike’s Code of Conduct, Labor Practices, 
and Cross-Cultural Awareness policy, as well 
as in its Safety, Health, Attitudes of Manage-
ment, People Investment and Environment 
(SHAPE) program.17
In addition to the initial, new source ap-
proval process that all potential suppliers of 
Nike must undergo,18 all factories are subject 
to three different types of audit:  a basic 
environmental, safety and health (SHAPE) 
audit, a more in-depth management and 
working conditions audit (M-Audit), and 
periodic inspections by the Fair Labor As-
sociation (FLA).
The SHAPE inspection was first launched 
in 1997 and is typically performed by Nike’s 
field-based production and sourcing staff. 
The goal of this audit is to provide a very gen-
eral picture of the factory’s compliance with 
labor, environment, and safety and health 
standards.  SHAPE inspections take about a 
day and occur once or twice yearly.
Launched in the summer of 2002, the M-
Audit (management audit) is the most rigorous 
of Nike’s audits and is seen as the core of its 
compliance program.  The M-Audit provides 
in-depth assessment of the labor-manage-
ment practices and working conditions at the 
factories.  A typical M-Audit takes 48 hours 
to complete and thus is spread out over sev-
eral days.  The M-Audit is always conducted 
by Nike’s in-house compliance specialists 
and is announced beforehand.  Each M-
Audit reports a numeric score (0–100) that 
represents a percentage against a perfect 
compliance score.  A score of 100 means that 
the factory is in full compliance with Nike’s 
code of conduct.  The M-Audit covers more 
than 80 items, focused on hiring practices, 
worker treatment, worker-management com-
munications, and compensation.  Each item 
accounts for a specific weighting with respect 
to the overall score.  As a result of this scor-
ing system, factories with different types of 
problems or mixes of compliance issues can 
receive similar overall scores.19
Independent monitoring by the Fair Labor 
Association is also conducted on a sample 
(5%) of Nike suppliers every year.  The FLA 
is a multi-stakeholder initiative that brings 
together companies, universities, and NGOs 
and supervises independent monitors’ unan-
nounced inspections of supplier factories. 
Nike is a member of the FLA and thus subject 
to these yearly inspections.  All FLA reports, 
with plants’ individual identities masked, are 
made public on the organization’s web site 
(www.fairlabor.org).
Data and Methods
Nike provided us with data from all three 
of the above audits, as well as from its Com-
pliance Rating program.  Starting in June 
2001, Nike began a grading system for all 
its suppliers.  This system also evolved over 
time so that by 2005, a letter grade (A–D) was 
assigned to individual factories.  The letter 
grade reflects all the information about a fac-
tory collected from the SHAPE inspections, 
16For more on Nike’s current compliance activities, 
see Nike (2005, Chap. 4).
17The evolution of Nike’s corporate responsibility 
practices is nicely described in Zadek (2004).
18In 2004, only 57% of factories that underwent this 
process were approved.  See Nike (2005:18) for more 
on this process.
19For more on the M-Audit and its scoring system, 
see Nike (2005:35–36).
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M-Audits, FLA audits, and factory visits and 
is assigned by the local compliance manager. 
(See Appendix 2 for an explanation of the 
different grades assigned to the factories.) 
The goal of the compliance rating system is 
to provide information to (and help shape 
decisions of) Nike sourcing and production 
managers.  Because of the mixed quality of 
the SHAPE audits and the limited numbers 
of the FLA audits, we focus our analyses on 
data derived from the M-Audits and the 
Compliance Rating program.  In addition, 
Nike provided us access to its sourcing data 
base, which allowed us to collect descriptive 
information (age of facility, total number of 
employees working at the facility, national-
ity of the owners of the facilities, and so on) 
for each factory producing goods for the 
company.
Does Monitoring Work?  
A Look at the Data
Using data from the M-Audits and the 
Compliance Rating program, in this section 
we address three questions.  First, how bad 
(or good) are working conditions among 
Nike’s suppliers?  There is tremendous 
debate over workplace conditions in global 
supply chain factories.  Using systematic data 
collected by Nike’s compliance staff, what 
can we learn about the actual conditions in 
these factories?  Second, if the data reveal 
variation in working conditions among Nike’s 
suppliers, what accounts for this variation? 
Why do factories producing more or less the 
same goods for the same brand treat their 
workers so differently?  And third, are work-
ing conditions improving over time in these 
factories?  Given Nike’s large investments in 
its various compliance efforts since the late 
1990s, how successful at remediation have 
these monitoring efforts been?
How Good or Bad 
Are Working Conditions?
To address this question, we first pres-
ent some descriptive data on Nike’s supply 
base, derived from the M-Audit data base. 
As described above, each M-Audit reports a 
numeric score (0–100) that represents a per-
centage against a perfect compliance score. 
A score of 100 means that the individual fac-
tory is in full compliance with Nike’s code of 
conduct.  Table 1 presents the mean scores 
and standard deviations for all factories (575) 
that underwent M-Audits in Nike’s three 
major lines of business (footwear, apparel, 
and equipment).  Because this program was 
launched only in the summer of 2002 and 
because it is very time-consuming, not all Nike 
suppliers have undergone an M-Audit.  On 
average, the data presented below indicate 
that the performance of Nike’s suppliers, 
while not perfect (a score of 100), has been 
somewhat above average.  The mean of their 
performance is at 65%, with a standard de-
viation of 16%.
However, as shown in Figure 1, there 
is considerable variation in performance 
on the M-Audit across Nike’s supply base. 
Factories’ scores range from 20% to a near 
perfect (90%) score.
Figure 2 reveals that this pattern of varia-
tion cuts across the major product lines of 
Nike.  In other words, regardless of what the 
factory is producing, be it garments or foot-
wear or even some types of sports equipment, 
there appears to be a “normal” distribution 
of M-Audit scores.
However, when analyzing these data along 
geographic lines, to see how factory perfor-
mance on the M-Audit may be shaped by the 
region in which the factories are located, we 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics, M-Audit Scores.
Standard
Sector Mean Deviation Observations
Apparel 0.66 0.15 357
(.008)  
Footwear 0.68 0.17 64
(.02)  
Equipment 0.64 0.16 109
(.015)  
Total 0.65 0.16 575a
(.007)  
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  F(2,572) = 
1.35; Prob > F = 0.26.  Bartlett’s test for equal variances: 
Chi2(2) =   3.3183; Prob > Chi2 = 0.190.
a45 additional factories received an M-Audit but we 
were unable to classify them by industry.  Thus, they are 
included in the total but not in the industry columns.
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find more pronounced variation.  Factories in 
the Americas and the EMEA (Europe–Middle 
East–Africa) region almost always perform 
above 50% on the M-Audit and often closer 
to 100%.  However, in the North Asian (which 
includes China and Vietnam) and South 
Asian (which includes Indonesia and India) 
regions, the M-Audit scores are much more 
Figure 1. The Distribution of M-Audit Score.
3
2
1
0
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
D
en
si
ty
M-Audit Score
Density
kDensity M-Audit
Figure 2. First M-Audit Score by Product Type.
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
D
en
si
ty
First M-Audit Score
Apparel
Equipment
Footwear
12 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
dispersed.20  Table 2 and Figure 3 illustrate 
this regional variation.
Thus we observe that although Nike’s 
suppliers appear to be performing above 
average in terms of their M-Audit scores 
(65%), which suggests that working condi-
tions in these factories are not as terrible as 
one might fear, there nonetheless exists tre-
mendous variation in M-Audit scores (hence 
working conditions) across factories in the 
world.  Some factories appear to be almost 
in complete compliance with Nike’s code of 
conduct, while others suffer from endemic 
problems with poor wages, excessive work 
hours, harassment, and so on.  Even within 
regions—within individual countries, in 
fact—working conditions, as captured by the 
M-Audit scores, vary tremendously.  How do 
we explain this variation?  In other words, 
why are factories that are making more or 
less the same products for the same brand 
treating their workers so differently?
Explaining the Variation in M-Audit Scores
To explain variation in working condi-
tions, as indicated by the M-Audit scores, 
we developed a two-step model.  To isolate 
actual workplace conditions (as measured 
by the compliance score) from the potential 
impact of the monitoring process, we examine 
the variation of the initial M-Audit21 scores 
across factories, using an OLS model.  In this 
model, we consider two principal groups of 
independent variables:  factory characteris-
tics, and the supplier factory’s relationship 
with Nike.
Factory characteristics.  The literature on 
labor monitoring suggests that a variety of 
factors—ownership, size of plant, type/com-
plexity/price of the product being manu-
factured—may all affect labor conditions 
in the factories.  Some have speculated that 
factories owned and managed by foreigners 
treat their workers less well (for a variety 
of linguistic and cultural reasons) than do 
factories whose owners and managers share 
the workers’ nationality.  Other observers 
have claimed that larger, more bureaucratic, 
“modern” factories, being better able than 
smaller, less formally managed plants to 
introduce modern management and per-
sonnel systems, are in a better position to 
treat their workers well (Moran 2002:16). 
Finally, much has been written about the 
importance of skill and tacit knowledge in 
the production of differentiated, high-value-
added products.  From this we speculate that 
perhaps factories producing more complex 
(and expensive) products, which require 
more skilled labor, will treat their workers 
as valuable assets (Kochan et al. 1986; Piore 
and Sable 1984).  We investigate whether 
factory ownership (foreign-owned versus 
domestic-owned), factory size, and product 
type (footwear, apparel, or equipment) may 
all affect compliance.
Table 2.  Summary Statistics for 
First M-Audit Score, by Region.
Standard
Region Mean Deviation Observations
Americas 0.77 0.10 134
(0.009)  
N. Asia 0.61 0.14 198
(0.01)  
S. Asia 0.58 0.17 181
(0.013)  
EMEA 0.71 0.12 62
(0.015)  
Total 0.65 0.16 575
(0.0067)  
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  F(3,570) 
= 56.307; Prob > F = 0.0000.  Bartlett’s test for equal 
variances:  Chi2(3) = 38.01; Prob > Chi2 = 0.000.
20We examine the Americas, the EMEA, North Asia, 
and South Asia because these are the four macro-regions 
among which Nike divides its operations.
21We analyze initial scores rather than panel data here 
so that we can isolate actual workplace conditions (as 
indicated by compliance score) from the potential impact 
of the monitoring process.  A factory’s second M-Audit 
score may be influenced by its having been audited once 
already.  It would thus be difficult to include the second 
M-Audit score in the study of the cross-sectional variation 
of the actual workplace conditions without explicitly 
modeling the impact of the monitoring process on the 
second M-Audit outcome.
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Relationship with Nike.  The second major 
dimension we investigate is the relationship 
between the supplier factory and Nike. 
Frenkel and Scott (2002) have argued that 
brands develop two distinct types of compli-
ance relationships with their suppliers:  a 
hands-on, cooperative relationship with some 
suppliers, and an arms-length, more distrust-
ful “compliance” relationship with others. 
These differences, according to Frenkel 
and Scott, can shape not just the style but 
also the substance of compliance programs 
within the factories.  To evaluate whether 
such a pattern exists, we investigate both 
the length of time Nike has been contracting 
with the supplier (on the assumption that 
the longer the business relationship, the 
greater will be the “trust” between Nike and 
the individual supplier) and whether or not 
the supplier has been designated by Nike as a 
strategic partner.  Strategic partners are those 
suppliers that Nike has designated as tier-one 
suppliers.  Some of them (in footwear) are 
involved in collaborative design and product 
development processes.  Others (in apparel) 
are permitted to source their own materials 
and are seen as long-term partners.  Thus, 
one would expect better labor compliance 
among strategic partners than among other, 
less strategic suppliers.22
To further assess the relationship between 
Nike and its suppliers, we investigate the 
amount of capacity the factory dedicates to Nike
(as opposed to other brands) and the number 
of visits Nike personnel (compliance and produc-
tion) make to the factories in any one year.  We 
hypothesize that the more capacity a factory 
dedicates to Nike, the stronger the relation-
ship and thus the higher the labor compli-
ance (M-Audit) score should be.  In addition, 
given that some scholars have reported that 
increased frequency of labor inspections led 
to improved workplace conditions and code 
compliance (Esbenshade 2004, Chap. 3), we 
hypothesize that the more frequently a factory 
Figure 3. First M-Audit Score by Region.
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22For more on how buyer/supplier collaboration in 
manufacturing and design can lead to innovation and the 
development of trust-like relations, see Sabel (1994).
14 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
is audited (by compliance and production 
staff), the better will be its compliance (as 
expressed by a higher M-Audit score).
Country and Industry Effects
Above, we documented tremendous varia-
tion in M-Audit scores by region.  To inves-
tigate the “country effect” on compliance 
scores, we employ the rule of law index from 
the World Bank’s WorldWide Governance 
Indicators23 as a proxy for a country’s legal 
and regulatory environment.  The rule of 
law index24 measures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of a given country (Kaufmann et al. 
2004).  These include perceptions of crime 
incidence, the effectiveness and predictability 
of the judiciary, and the enforceability of 
contracts.  The index is measured in units 
ranging from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance out-
comes.  To control for the industry effect, 
we first look at all Nike suppliers and then 
insert industry dummy variables for footwear, 
apparel, and equipment.  We also look at 
within-industry variation.
We combine the different variables in the 
following OLS model:
(1.1) M-Audit = a0 + a1 Log total 
employees + a2(ownership 
+ a3(number of visits by 
Nike) + a4(strategic partnership) 
+ a5(duration of relationship 
with Nike) + a6(percentage for 
Nike) + a7(rule of law) + 
a8(apparel) + a9(footwear) + ¡.
Using OLS regressions, we next seek to de-
termine whether composite M-Audit scores 
are correlated with dimensions of factory 
characteristics or with the closeness of the 
relationship between the factory and Nike. 
Consistent with our conceptual model, we 
focus on the initial M-Audit scores of the 
individual factories.  The results are reported 
in Table 4.  We also examined the relation-
ship between individual components of the 
M-Audit (such as wages and work hours) and 
different dimensions of factory characteris-
tics and different levels of the relationship 
with Nike and found consistent results.  These 
are reported in Appendix 5.
The regression analyses suggest the fol-
lowing findings:
(1) At the regional level, region dummies are 
all strongly statistically significant.  Region 
dummies reflect not only the geographic 
location of the factories, but also the way Nike 
organizes its business.  Nike has regional of-
fices in each of these four regions.  Different 
regional offices manifest somewhat different 
policies and enforcement practices.  The 
statistical significance of region dummies sup-
Table 3.  Summary Statistics, 
Selected Independent Variables.
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation
Total No. Employees 1,095 1,952
Ownership (1 = Foreign, 
  0 = Local) 0.37 0.48
Strategic Partner (1 = Yes, 
  0 = No) 0.19 0.39
Number of Shape Visits 5.52 4.49
Months with Nike 60.4 58.0
Percentage for Nike 47.3% 33.6%
Apparel 0.67 0.47
Footwear 0.12 0.33
Equipment 0.21 0.40
Index of Rule of Law of 
  Factory Country 0.11 0.74
23The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors project defines governance as the set of traditions 
and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised.  The political, economic, and institutional 
dimensions of governance are captured by six aggregate 
indicators:  voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corrup-
tion.  For detailed construction, see Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2006).
24We also considered other governance indices in 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators and other coun-
try-level indicators.  We get similar qualitative results. 
In Appendix 3, we present the regression values that 
result when we replace the rule of law index by the 
Economic Freedom index compiled by the Heritage 
Foundation.
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ports the argument that workplace conditions 
are shaped not only by factory-level condi-
tions and country-level conditions, but also 
by the way Nike organizes its production and 
sourcing practices, which vary from region 
to region.25  At the country level, the strength 
of a country’s regulations and institutions 
(using the rule of law index as a proxy) has 
a positive relationship with M-Audit scores. 
The first column in Table 4 shows that the 
rule of law index itself explains 11% of the 
variation in first M-Audit score.  Even when 
the analysis controls for regional effects (the 
Americas versus South Asia), the coefficient 
on the rule of law finding, although reduced 
by about one-third, remains statistically sig-
nificant.  This suggests that factories located 
in countries with better legal or regulatory 
environments on average do better in labor 
compliance.  This has potentially important 
implications for the sourcing decisions of 
global brands and also for the future opera-
Table 4.  Regression Result of First M-Audit Score on Selected Variables.
Coefficient
Variable (Standard Deviation)
Rule of Law Index 0.074**** 0.04**** 0.045**** 0.047**** 0.027**
(0.0086) (0.0084) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Log Number of Employees –0.025**** –0.022*** –.0133**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.0068)
Ownership –0.03* –0.025 –.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
No. of Shape_Visit 0.002 0.002 .0038*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Strategic Partner 0.047** 0.05** .002
(0.021) (0.02) (0.020)
Months_With Nike –0.00034* –0.00034* –.000014
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Nike_Percentage –0.071*** –0.066*** –.031
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Apparel –0.008 0.014 –.0035
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Footwear 0.12**** 0.12**** .088***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.03)
Region EMEA –0.061***  –.081****
(0.022)  (0.024)
Region N. Asia –0.14****  –0.16****
(0.016)  (0.021)
Region S. Asia –0.17****  –0.18****
(0.017)  (0.022)
Year 03 0.046**
(0.023)
Year 04 0.071***
(0.028)
Constant 0.64**** 0.75**** 0.82**** 0.75**** 0.85****
(0.064) (0.013) (0.045) (0.054) (0.04)
Observations 568 568 355 355 355
R Square 0.11 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.36
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level; ****at the .001 level.
25We also apply the hierarchical models to analyze 
the data.  We find that there are statistically significant 
variations across regions, countries, and factories.  See 
Appendix 4 for the regression table.
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tions of both companies and NGOs as they 
seek to tackle these issues.26
(2) Controlling for country and industry 
variables, at the factory level, there exists a 
statistically significant negative relationship 
between factory size, measured by total num-
ber of employees, and M-Audit performance. 
This suggests that working conditions in 
smaller factories are better than in larger 
factories.27  One possible explanation for this 
somewhat counter-intuitive finding could be 
that smaller factories (which, by the way, have 
on average over 1,000 employees) are easier  
to control and monitor than larger facilities, 
some of which employ tens of thousands of 
workers.
(3) After controlling for two other vari-
ables—factory location and industry—our 
analyses suggest that ownership (foreign 
versus national) has a statistically signifi-
cant relationship with M-Audit scores.  In 
other words, it does appear that workers 
receive worse treatment in factories owned 
by their compatriots than in foreign-owned 
factories.
(4) Within the category of Nike-related 
variables, the number of visits by Nike 
personnel and whether or not a factory is 
a strategic partner are positively associated 
with M-Audit scores.  However, the dura-
tion of the relationship with Nike and the 
percentage of capacity dedicated to Nike are 
negatively related to the M-Audit scores.  All 
four coefficients are statistically significant. 
When analyzing how frequently Nike staff 
visited individual factories, we were able to 
separate out different types of Nike person-
nel (for example, compliance officers as 
opposed to quality specialists or sourcing 
directors).  When we remove compliance 
staff from the analyses, we still obtain the 
same positive, statistically significant results. 
This suggests that this positive relationship is 
not the result of more frequent social audits 
and factory inspections.  Instead, something 
else appears to be happening.  One possible 
explanation for this apparently contradictory 
finding could be that factories that have a 
closer relationship with Nike are also those 
with more face-to-face contact with the Nike 
sourcing and production teams and, as such, 
engage in various initiatives, focusing on 
both process (lean manufacturing systems, 
for example) and quality (TQM), aimed at 
improving production efficiencies.  These, 
in turn, have positive spill-over effects on 
labor conditions.  An additional possible 
explanation is that frequent visits by produc-
tion and sourcing staff (but not compliance 
managers) lead to greater trust and a better 
working relationship between the brand and 
its suppliers.  This explanation is consistent 
with Frenkel and Scott’s (2002) comparative 
case study of two Adidas suppliers.  These 
relationships are explored in a related pa-
per (Locke and Romis 2007).  Interestingly 
enough, frequency of visits is not a function 
of whether a supplier is a strategic partner. 
The interaction effect of these two variables 
is not statistically significant.
(5) The negative relationship between 
M-Audit scores and the duration of Nike’s 
relationship with its suppliers could be ex-
plained in two ways.  Perhaps those factories 
with a longer working relationship with 
Nike are also older factories (that is, possess 
older plants and equipment), with resultantly 
poorer working conditions.  An alternative 
possible explanation is that Nike has become 
increasingly demanding in terms of labor 
compliance and thus more recent suppliers, 
having achieved or surpassed more stringent 
selection criteria, are better equipped to com-
ply with Nike’s code of conduct.  Interviews 
with Nike compliance staff indicate that the 
company has, in fact, stepped up demands 
for compliance by its suppliers.  This explains 
why 43% of potential suppliers fail their initial 
pre-sourcing approval process.  More recent 
26The importance of building state capacities, es-
pecially in the area of labor inspection, has been the 
focus of recent work by Michael Piore (2005).  See also 
Schrank (2005).
27To analyze the impact of factory size on M-Audit 
scores, we ran two tests.  First we compared individual 
factories against the average size of plants in their respec-
tive industries to see if the individual plants were either 
above or below the industry average.  Second, we sorted 
our sample into 10 subgroups, according to their size 
(number of employees), with the first subgroup contain-
ing the smallest 10% of factories and the tenth subgroup 
containing the largest 10%.  We then ran regressions 
using these subgroup dummies.  In both tests, the larger 
factories had significantly lower M-Audit scores.
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(newer) suppliers may also possess more 
modern technologies and factory structures, 
and this too may contribute to the observed 
result.  The negative relationship observed 
between the percentage of capacity dedicated 
to Nike and the M-Audit score could be seen 
as evidence that, contrary to arguments 
suggesting that suppliers are suffering from 
“audit fatigue,” multiple brands with differ-
ent monitoring programs may be promoting 
improvements and learning within the fac-
tory.  These different brands may also engage 
in informal cooperation with one another, 
thus presenting a more united front to the 
suppliers, who, in turn, respond to these com-
mon pressures.  Interviews with compliance 
managers at Nike and other brands confirm 
that informal information-sharing and coor-
dination do in fact take place among brands 
sourcing from the same factories.
The Change in Labor 
Compliance over Time
Since the late 1990s, Nike has been actively 
engaged in monitoring its supply base.  Over 
time, it has substantially expanded its compli-
ance staff, invested heavily in the training of its 
own staff and that of its suppliers, developed 
ever more rigorous audit protocols and inter-
nalized much of the auditing process, worked 
with third party social auditing companies 
and NGOs to check its own internal audits, 
and spent millions of dollars to improve 
working conditions at its supplier factories. 
Interviews conducted during field research 
for this project with Nike monitors and com-
pliance staff suggested that these people are 
serious, hard-working, and moved by genuine 
concern for workers and their rights.  Given 
all that Nike has invested in staff, time, and 
resources over the past decade, have condi-
tions at the factories improved?  In other 
words, did monitoring lead to remediation or 
improvement of working conditions?  We seek 
to evaluate this third question by examining 
historical data for both the M-Audits and the 
Compliance Rating scores.
Changes in M-Audit Scores
Table 5 summarizes the means and stan-
dard deviations of the first, second, and third 
M-Audit scores.  One hundred and seventeen 
(117) factories underwent two M-Audits, and 
5 factories were monitored a third time.  The 
descriptive statistics show an improvement.
Table 6, presenting initial M-Audit scores 
year by year, shows that in general, the per-
formance on the audits improved from 2002 
to 2004 (we ignore the 2005 number because 
it is based on only a few observations).
Thus, on average and over time, both for 
first-time audited factories and for factories 
that have been monitored more than once, it 
appears that working conditions (as expressed 
in their M-Audit scores) are improving.  This 
would suggest that monitoring works.
We conducted several tests to investigate 
whether there is a systematic upward or 
downward bias in the selection of factories 
audited a second or third time.  First we com-
pared the initial M-Audit scores of factories 
that did not receive subsequent audits with 
the scores of those that did, to see whether 
or not Nike chose to re-audit those factories 
that did better the first time around.  The 
comparison of the distribution of the M-
Audit scores of the single-audited factories 
against the distribution of the initial scores 
of the multiple-audited factories is shown in 
Figure 4.  The T-test results are presented 
in Table 7.
We see from Table 7 that there is no statisti-
cally significant difference between the two 
Table 6.  Time Trend for 
M-Audit Score (First M-Audit Only).
Standard
Year of M-Audit Mean Deviation Observations
M-Audit in 2002 0.638 0.130 61
M-Audit in 2003 0.643 0.167 351
M-Audit in 2004 0.673 0.155 159
M-Audit in 2005 0.44 0.081 4
Table 5.  Initial and Subsequent M-Audits.
Standard
M-Audit Sequence Mean Deviation Observations
First M-Audit Score 0.65 0.16 575
Second M-Audit Score 0.70 0.16 117
Third M-Audit Score 0.82 0.07 5
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Table 7.  Comparison of the First M-Audit Score between 
Factories Monitored Once and Factories Monitored Multiple Times.
First M-Audit Score
Factory Group Mean Standard Deviation Observations
Factories with Only One M-Audit 0.65 0.16 458
Factories with More Than One M-Audit 0.64 0.16 117
Test:  Diff = Mean (First M-Audit Score of Single M-Audit Factories) – Mean (First M-Audit Score of Multiple 
M-Audit Factories).
H0:   Diff = 0.
T = 0.7643; Degrees of Freedom = 573.
groups.  Figure 4 also shows that two waves 
of M-Audits have very similar probability 
densities.
We then explored whether the sample 
of factories that received second M-Audits 
was biased in any way toward certain fac-
tory characteristics (size, age, location).  We 
conducted probit models with “whether a 
factory received a second M-Audit” as the 
dependent variable.  The results are shown 
in Table 8.
The probit models show that there does 
appear to have been some bias in the sample 
of factories that received a second audit.  Stra-
tegic partners and factories that dedicated a 
larger proportion of their capacity to Nike 
were more likely to receive a second M-Audit. 
In fact, strategic partnership itself explains a 
big proportion (15%) of the variation in the 
likelihood of a second M-Audit.  Moreover, 
factories located in countries with a lower 
rule of law index, or with weaker legal and 
regulatory systems, were also more likely to 
be re-audited.  This suggests that the biases 
go in two different directions and, thus, more 
or less cancel each other out.  We know from 
our analyses of the first round of M-Audits 
that strategic partners usually performed bet-
ter (had higher scores) than non–strategic 
partners.  However, we also learned from the 
analyses of the first round of M-Audits that 
performance in these audits tended to be 
worse for factories located in countries with 
weaker regulatory systems and factories with 
a greater percentage of capacity dedicated 
to Nike.  Interviews with senior compliance 
managers at Nike indicate that the company 
chose to concentrate its resources on both 
high-risk factories and suppliers with which it 
hopes to develop more long-lasting relation-
ships.  Moreover, as stated previously, Nike has 
become more stringent in its initial screening 
of factories, weeding out factories with poor 
compliance records.  The company is also 
disengaging from suppliers that consistently 
violate its code of conduct.28
The Change in Compliance Ratings (CRs)
To better assess whether factory conditions 
were improving over time, we also examined 
the Compliance Ratings that all Nike suppli-
ers are assigned.  Because these ratings are 
easier to understand than are M-Audit scores, 
they are used more often by Nike managers 
to guide production and sourcing decisions. 
The goal of the Compliance Rating program 
is to develop a tool that integrates compli-
ance and sourcing decisions.  A grade (A–D) 
is given by the local compliance managers 
and is based on all audits and factory visits 
by Nike staff as well as by the FLA.  (See 
Appendix 2 for an explanation of the grad-
ing system.)  The most recent Compliance 
Rating Database, in which over 700 factories 
have more than one CR rating, enables us to 
examine the change in workplace conditions 
as measured by the CR grade given to the fac-
tory over time.  To assess change over time 
in the compliance rating, we first describe 
the overall ratings of all Nike suppliers and 
how they have evolved over time.  We then 
examine individual factories, comparing 
28For more on this, see Nike, Inc., “Innovate for a 
Better World:  FY05-06 Corporate Responsibility Report,” 
May 31, 2007, pp. 39–42.
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their first grade with their last to evaluate 
how conditions have evolved.
Tables 9 and 10 present summary statistics 
for the CR grades assigned to Nike’s suppliers. 
There are 3,686 observations of CR ratings 
in total, with half of the factories receiving a 
B grade.  From 2001 to 2004, the average CR 
score declined, and that was most obvious in 
2003 and 2004.
Figure 5 illustrates the shift in the dis-
tribution of grades over time.  In 2003 and 
2004, the number of factories that received 
an A grade dropped dramatically while the 
number of factories receiving a C or D grade 
increased.  However, it is important to note 
that the pools of factories that received the 
CR scores differed from year to year.  Thus, 
based on these aggregate data, we do not 
know whether the overall CR performance 
of Nike’s supply base worsened over time 
or if Nike has paid increasing attention to 
poor-performing factories.
However, when examination turns to the 
same factories over time (that is, when we 
compare their very first CR grade with their 
last grade), a more negative picture emerges. 
Almost half of the factories experienced no 
change in compliance rating, and over 36% 
experienced a decrease in their CR grade. 
In other words, according to Nike’s own 
Compliance Rating system, workplace con-
ditions in almost 80% of its suppliers either 
remained the same or worsened over time. 
See Table 11.
Thus we see that on one measure, the M-
Audit score, factory workplace conditions 
appear to have been improving over time, 
while on another measure (also generated 
internally by Nike’s own staff), workplace 
conditions were either stagnant or getting 
worse.  One possible explanation for this 
apparently contradictory finding is that the 
two tools are measuring different things:  the 
M-Audit privileges documentary evidence 
and company records, whereas the Compli-
ance Rating program is a more subjective 
appraisal of factory management’s attitudes 
toward these issues.  Interviews with Nike 
compliance staff suggest that these two tools 
are, in fact, picking up different facets of the 
factory reality.  Another possible explanation 
for the divergence in results between these 
two compliance programs is that suppliers 
are “learning” how to perform on the M-
Figure 4. First M-Audit Score of Factories with Only One M-Audit vs.
Those with Multiple M-Audits.
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Table 8.  Probit Regression of the 
Likelihood of Subsequent M-Audits.
Coefficient
Variable (Standard Deviation)
First M-Audit Score –.2802  –1.89***
(.6384)  (.66)
Strategic Partner  1.3152*** 1.07****
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)  (.1436) (.22)
Log No. Employees   .11
  (.10)
Ownership (1 =    .34*
Foreign, 0 = Local)   (.19)
Number of Visits   .0001
  (.026)
Months with Nike   –.0002
  (.0026)
Nike Percentage   0.92***
  (.31)
Rule of Law   –.25*
  (.14)
Apparel   .82***
  (.26)
Footwear   .79**
  (.39)
Region EMEA   –.97***
  (.34)
Region N. Asia   –.97****
  (.27)
Region S. Asia   –.98***
  (0.32)
Constant –.6481** –1.1594*** –.98
  (.76)
Observations 575 575 355
R-Square .15 .28
LR Chi2(1)/
  LR Chi2(13)  85.97*** 117.8****
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 
level; ***at the .01 level; ****at the .001 level.
Audit by better preparing their documents 
and perhaps even coaching their workers, 
but that Nike’s local compliance staff are not 
fooled and thus are grading suppliers on what 
is actually happening on the factory floor. 
This too was suggested to us in interviews 
with compliance managers in the field and 
at Nike headquarters.
Concluding Considerations
Notwithstanding all the controversies 
over corporate codes of conduct and private 
voluntary regulation, monitoring for compli-
ance with codes of conduct is the principal 
means by which both global corporations and 
labor rights NGOs currently seek to address 
poor working conditions in global supply 
chain factories.  Using a unique data set 
based on factory audits of over 800 of Nike’s 
suppliers located in 51 different countries, 
we have sought to analyze the effectiveness 
of this approach.  Our data have at least two 
limitations.  First, they are based on internal, 
company-based audits and thus may be biased 
in favor of the company.  As our analyses have 
illustrated, these data nonetheless reveal very 
serious issues with working conditions and 
labor rights among Nike’s suppliers.  Sec-
ond, the data pertain only to one company, 
Nike Inc.  However, given the central and 
highly controversial place Nike occupies 
in the debates over globalization and labor 
standards, we feel that it serves as a “crucial 
case” through which to explore the effect of 
monitoring on workplace conditions.29
The data and analyses presented above 
show that working conditions at Nike’s sup-
pliers (as indicated by each factory’s score 
on the M-Audit) are quite mixed.  Some 
factories appear to have been substantially or 
fully compliant with Nike’s code of conduct, 
while others appear to have been suffering 
from persistent problems with wages, work 
hours, and health and safety.  This variation 
in working conditions appears to be the re-
sult of country effects (the labor inspectorate’s 
ability or inability to enforce labor laws and 
standards in the country in which the factory 
is located), factory characteristics (the age and 
size of the factory), and the relationship between 
Nike and the particular supplier (whether the 
supplier is a strategic partner, how often Nike 
[non-compliance] staff visit and interact with 
the factory, and who else is sourcing product 
from the same factory).
The findings of this paper also suggest that 
notwithstanding Nike’s very real interests 
in improving its image vis-à-vis these issues 
and the company’s considerable efforts and 
29For more on “crucial case” methodology, see 
Eckstein (1991).
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Table 9.  Summary of CR-Rating by Score.
Score A B C D Total
Counts 571 1,945 699 471 3,686
Percentage 15.49 52.77 18.96 12.78 100
investments over the past decade to improve 
working conditions among its suppliers, the 
results produced by monitoring appear to 
have been limited, and perhaps mixed.  After 
years spent by Nike developing ever more 
comprehensive monitoring tools, hiring 
growing numbers of internal compliance 
specialists, conducting hundreds of factory 
audits, and working with external consultants 
and NGOs, analyses of the company’s own 
data suggest that conditions have improved 
somewhat in some of its suppliers but either 
stagnated or deteriorated in many others. 
Interviews with other global brands, NGO 
representatives, and leaders of the major 
multi-stakeholder initiatives indicate that 
Nike’s experience with monitoring is by no 
means unique.  In short, monitoring alone 
is not producing the large and sustained 
improvements in workplace conditions that 
many had hoped it would.  This has impor-
tant implications for company, NGO, and 
government policy.
Further analysis will be needed to bet-
ter understand not simply the relational 
strength of the above findings, but also, and 
more important, their causal linkages.  Yet 
these findings also provide insights into and 
ingredients for what could be a different (al-
though perhaps complementary) approach 
toward improving working conditions and 
labor rights in these factories.  For example, 
if improved working conditions are the result 
of more stringent or capable state regulation 
and monitoring, then proponents of inter-
national labor standards should focus their 
attention on helping developing countries 
build up this capacity.  Conversely, if improved 
working conditions appear to be a by-prod-
uct of more frequent and open interactions 
between the brands and their suppliers, and 
their assistance in improving production ef-
ficiencies and capabilities of their suppliers, 
then current arrangements, which appear to 
be based on short-term contracts, arms-length 
relationships, and ever-more sophisticated 
systems of policing and monitoring, need 
to be re-thought.
Recall the positive relationship between 
the frequency with which Nike sourcing, pro-
duction, and quality personnel visited certain 
factories and the scores these same factories 
received on their M-Audits.  During the field 
research for this project, we explored what 
might be behind this relationship.  We found 
that some suppliers were collaborating with 
Nike personnel to introduce new quality im-
provement programs or lean manufacturing 
systems (or both).  This explains why these 
more technical and business-oriented staff 
(as opposed to the compliance specialists) 
were visiting these particular factories more 
often.  As these particular suppliers improved 
the efficiency and quality of their own opera-
tions, they were better able to schedule their 
workload (hence, avoid excessive overtime) 
and increase their workers’ wages (sharing 
the efficiencies gains).  Moreover, having 
invested tremendously in training aimed at 
enabling their workers to effectively operate 
their new production and quality improve-
ment programs, managers at these factories 
were wary of mistreating these highly skilled 
workers for fear that they would leave and 
work for a competitor.  Similarly, workers who 
have been trained to “stop the line” when they 
see a possible defect, and those trained to 
Table 10.  Summary of CR-Rating by Year.a
Year Mean of CR Score Observations
2001 2.986 220
2002 2.948 1,132
2003 2.545 1,004
2004 2.584 1,323
aIn order to translate the letter grades into numeri-
cal scores, we assigned values to each letter:  A = 4, B 
= 3, C = 2, D = 1.
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work in more autonomous production cells, 
are also more likely to resist management 
abuses on the shop floor.  These findings, 
which are further developed in a compan-
ion paper (Locke and Romis 2007), appear 
to be corroborated by similar research on 
other global companies (Frenkel and Scott 
2002).
The above considerations suggest that 
global brands and labor rights NGOs would 
do well to complement their current emphasis 
on monitoring by providing suppliers tech-
nical and organizational assistance to tackle 
some of the root causes of their poor working 
conditions.  Perhaps not all suppliers would 
be willing to collaborate with global brands 
and NGOs on these efforts, but refusals to 
collaborate could provide global brands with 
a justification to shift orders and consolidate 
production in more efficient, cooperative, 
and perhaps even “ethical” suppliers.  Some 
level of monitoring or compliance would still 
need to take place, but perhaps this could 
be done by developing, and then collaborat-
ing with, country government authorities 
invested with the capacity and legitimacy to 
exercise their rightful duty and enforce their 
own laws.  This too could lead to manifold 
positive spill-over effects for the developing 
countries and their citizens.
Looked at in its full evolutionary context, 
the Nike case suggests that if working condi-
tions and labor rights for the millions of work-
ers employed in global supply chain factories 
are to be improved, a more systemic approach 
will be needed, one that combines external 
(countervailing) pressure—be it from the 
state, or unions, or labor-rights NGOs—with 
comprehensive and transparent monitor-
ing systems and a variety of “management 
systems” interventions aimed at eliminating 
the root causes of poor working conditions. 
External pressures from NGOs and other 
advocacy groups are what motivated Nike to 
introduce a code of conduct and a monitor-
ing system.  It took several years for Nike to 
develop its own internal standards, recruit 
and train a professional staff, and implement 
a monitoring system.  The system provided 
the data needed to assess progress and iden-
tify areas needing further improvement.  At 
the same time, Nike’s efforts to implement 
modern production and quality manage-
ment practices complemented its efforts to 
improve monitoring and labor standards. 
The next phase in the evolutionary process 
is to adjust Nike’s other business strategies 
and organizational processes so that they too 
recognize and address root causes of poor 
working conditions.
Interestingly, Nike has begun to shift its 
compliance strategy toward this more col-
laborative model.  Nike’s new “generation 
3” compliance strategy acknowledges that 
policing its suppliers is not enough.  Instead, 
the company is seeking to supplement moni-
toring with collaborative initiatives aimed 
at diffusing workplace and human resource 
management best practices among its suppli-
ers.  It has also updated its various audit tools 
and grading systems in order to make them 
more accurate and transparent to suppliers 
and to its own business units.  In addition to 
these efforts to improve and supplement its 
monitoring systems, Nike has begun an ex-
tensive review of the company’s own upstream 
business processes—such as product devel-
opment, design, and commercialization—in 
order to identify potential drivers of excessive 
overtime among suppliers.  All of this suggests 
Figure 5. The Distribution of CR Rating
(percentage) from 2001 to 2004.
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that Nike is working on promoting greater 
integration of its labor compliance initiatives 
with core business processes.30
This more systemic approach is precisely 
how previous issues (such as improving 
product quality, promoting occupational 
health and safety, and redressing inequality 
of opportunity in employment and promo-
tion decisions) were tackled.  In each of 
these prior cases, external pressures led to 
company-sponsored standards and compli-
ance programs.  The limited results of this 
initial response led to the adoption of new 
management systems that elevated and inte-
grated these issues into the core operations 
of the business.  Programs promoting basic 
compliance with OSHA and EEOC standards 
or even ever-greater demands for improved 
quality were replaced by new forms of work 
organization and human resource manage-
ment systems that ensured not only more 
healthy and equitable workplaces but also 
new sources of competitive advantage for the 
firms embracing these policies.31
Improving labor standards in global supply 
chain factories will require a parallel journey. 
We hope our research will help induce global 
companies, NGOs, governments, and even 
scholars—all of us—to take the first collective 
step down this path.
Table 11.  Changes in CR Grades over Time.a
Change in CR Rating Frequency Percent
–3 (Down by 3 Degrees) 20 2.62
–2 (Down by 2 Degrees) 74 9.70
–1 (Down by 1 Degree) 181 23.72
0  (No Change) 323 42.33
1  (Up by 1 Degree) 116 15.20
2  (Up by 2 Degrees) 42 5.50
3  (Up by 3 Degrees) 7 0.92
Total 763 100
aThe change in CR rating is calculated as the score 
from the most recent audit minus the score from the 
earliest audit.
30See Nike, Inc., “Innovating for a Better World: 
FY05-06 Corporate Responsibility Report” for more on 
these changes.
31For more on the evolution of these practices, see 
Dobbin and Sutton (1998).  The evolution of compliance 
with OSHA regulations is nicely described in Weil (1991, 
1996).  The evolution of the total quality movement is 
nicely described in Shiba et al. (1993, Chaps. 1 and 2), 
Cole (1999), and Weick (1999).
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Appendix 1
Nike Code of Conduct
Nike, Inc. Was Founded on a Handshake
Implicit in that act was the determination that we would build our business with all of our partners based on trust, 
teamwork, honesty and mutual respect.  We expect all of our business partners to operate on the same principles.
At the core of the NIKE corporate ethic is the belief that we are a company comprised of many different kinds 
of people, appreciating individual diversity, and dedicated to equal opportunity for each individual.
NIKE designs, manufactures .and markets products for sports and fitness consumers.  At every step in that 
process, we are driven to do not only what is required by law, but what is expected of a leader.  We expect our busi-
ness partners to do the same.  NIKE partners with contractors who share our commitment to best practices and 
continuous improvement in:
1.  Management practices that respect the rights of all employees, including the right to free association and 
collective bargaining
2.  Minimizing our impact on the environment
3.  Providing a safe and healthy work place
4.  Promoting the health and well-being of all employees
Contractors must recognize the dignity of each employee, and the right to a work place free of harassment, abuse 
or corporal punishment.  Decisions on hiring, salary, benefits, advancement, termination or retirement must be 
based solely on the employee’s ability to do the job.  There shall be no discrimination based on race, creed, gender, 
marital or maternity status, religious or political beliefs, age or sexual orientation.
Wherever NIKE operates around the globe we are guided by this Code of Conduct and we bind our contractors 
to these principles.  Contractors must post this Code in all major workspaces, translated into the language of the 
employee, and must train employees on their rights and obligations as defined by this Code and applicable local 
laws.
While these principles establish the spirit of our partnerships, we also bind our partners to specific standards of 
conduct.  The core standards are set forth below.
Forced Labor
The contractor does not use forced labor in any form—prison, indentured, bonded or otherwise.
Child Labor
The contractor does not employ any person below the age of 18 to produce footwear.  The contractor does 
not employ any person below the age of 16 to produce apparel, accessories or equipment.  If at the time Nike 
production begins, the contractor employs people of the legal working age who are at least 15, that employment 
may continue, but the contractor will not hire any person going forward who is younger than the Nike or legal age 
limit, whichever is higher.  To further ensure these age standards are complied with, the contractor does not use 
any form of homework for Nike production.
Compensation
The contractor provides each employee at least the minimum wage, or the prevailing industry wage, whichever 
is higher; provides each employee a clear, written accounting for every pay period; and does not deduct from em-
ployee pay for disciplinary infractions.
Benefits
The contractor provides each employee all legally mandated benefits.
Hours of Work/Overtime
The contractor complies with legally mandated work hours; uses overtime only when each employee is fully 
compensated according to local law; informs each employee at the time of hiring if mandatory overtime is a condi-
tion of employment; and on a regularly scheduled basis provides one day off in seven, and requires no more than 
60 hours of work per week on a regularly scheduled basis, or complies with local limits if they are lower.
Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H)
The contractor has written environmental, safety and health policies and standards, and implements a system 
to minimize negative effects on the environment, reduce work-related injury and illness, and promote the general 
health of employees.
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Documentation and Inspection
The contractor maintains on file all documentation needed to demonstrate compliance with this Code of Con-
duct and required laws; agrees to make these documents available for Nike or its designated monitor; and agrees 
to submit to inspections with or without prior notice.
Last updated March 2005
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=code
Accessed June 21, 2006
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Appendix 2
Nike’s Compliance Rating System
Grade Compliance Rating Criteria Description
A No more than five minor issues outstanding Non-compliance issues that do not reach levels
on the Master Action Plan and no more than defined as C or D issues (see below).
20% of MAP items past due.
B More than five minor issues, but no serious or Non-compliance issues that do not reach levels
critical issues outstanding on the MAP and no defined as C or D issues (see below).
more than 30% of MAP items past due.
C One or more C-level issues, but no D-level issues • Lack of basic terms of employment (contracts, 
outstanding on the MAP or more than 30% of   documented training on terms, equal pay, 
MAP items past due. discriminatory screening)
  • Non-compliance with local laws on treatment of 
  migrant workers
  • Less-than-legal benefits not related to income 
  security (for example, leave)
  • Excessive hours of work:  greater than 60 hours/
  week but less than 72 hours/week
  • Exceeding legal annual overtime work hour limit 
  for 10% or more of the work force
  • Not providing one day off in seven
  • Verbal or psychological harassment or abuse
  • Conditions likely to lead to moderate injury or 
  illness to workers
  • Conditions likely to lead to moderate harm to the 
  environment or community
D One or more D-level issues outstanding on • Unwillingness to comply with Code standards
MAP or serious issues past due; or more than • Denial of access to authorized Nike compliance
40% of open MAP items past due. inspectors
  • Falsification of records and coaching of workers to 
  falsify information
  • Homework, or unauthorized subcontracting
  • Underage workers
  • Forced labor:  bonded, indentured, prison
  • Denial of worker rights to Freedom of Association 
  where legal
  • Pregnancy testing
  • Confirmed physical or sexual abuse
  • Paying below legal wage
  • Denial of benefits tied to income security
  • No verifiable timekeeping system
  • Exceeding legal daily work hour limit or work in 
  excess of 72 hours/week for 10% or more of the 
  work force
  • Not providing one day off in 14 days
  • Conditions that can lead to death or serious injury
  • Conditions that can lead to serious harm to the 
  environment
Source:  Nike Corporate Responsibility Report:  Part II.  FY ’04, p. 25.  Accessed June 21, 2006.  http://www.nike.
com/nikebiz/qc/r/fy04_Nike_CR_report_pt2.pdf
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Appendix 3
Explaining the Variation in First M-Audit Scores:  Alternative Country Level Indices
In this appendix, we present the regression results for First M-Audit scores on selected variables using a country-
level index different from the World Bank’s rule of law index we used in the text (Table 4).  Here, we use instead 
the Economic Freedom Index compiled by the Heritage Foundation.32  The Index of Economic Freedom measures 
161 countries against a list of 50 independent variables divided into 10 broad factors of economic freedom.  Scores 
range from 1 to 5.  Low scores are more desirable.  The higher the score on a factor, the greater the level of gov-
ernment interference in the economy and the less economic freedom a country enjoys.  The Index of Economic 
Freedom includes the broadest array of institutional factors determining economic freedom.33
Table A3 presents the regression results.  The results are very similar to those reported in Table 4.  (The sign 
on Economics index is negative here.  Note that a low Economic Freedom Index is better, while a high rule of law 
index is more desirable).
Table A3
Results of Regressing the First M-Audit Score on Selected Variables, Using the Economic Freedom Index
Coefficient
Variable (Standard Deviation)
Economic Freedom Index –0.12**** –0.065**** –0.083**** –0.089**** –0.041***
(0.001) (0.0011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Log Number of Employees –0.016** –0.012* –.012*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ownership –0.03* –0.022 –0.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Num. of Shape_Visit 0.002 0.002 0.0037*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Strategic Partner 0.038* 0.04* 0.004
(0.021) (0.02) (0.020)
Months_with Nike –0.00038* –0.00037* –.000014
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Nike_Percentage –0.049* –0.042 –0.026
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
Apparel –0.0067 0.013 –0.0017
(0.019) (0.0192) (0.018)
Footwear 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.085***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.03)
Region EMEA –0.040*  –0.069***
(0.022)  (0.025)
Region N. Asia –0.12****  –0.15****
(0.017)  (0.021)
Region S. Asia –0.14****  –0.17****
(0.018)  (0.023)
Year 2003 0.048**
(0.023)
Year 2004 0.080***
(0.028)
Constant 0.99**** 0.94**** 1.01**** 00.94**** 0.96****
(0.031) (0.03) (0.04) (0.047) (0.04)
Observations 568 568 355 355 355
R-Square 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.36
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Table A4
Two-Level Hierarchical Model of First M-Audit Score on Selected Variables
(Level One:  Factories;  Level Two:  Regions)
  Coefficient
Variable (Standard Deviation)
Rule of Law Index 0.038**** 0.04**** 0.029*** 0.032***
  (0.01) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Num. of Shape Visit 0.0036* 0.0036*
  (0.0018) (0.002)
Ownership –0.027** –0.019 –0.028* –0.020
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Log(No. Employees) –0.011* –0.012*
  (0.0064) (0.007)
Strategic Partner 0.048*** 0.004
  (0.15) (0.019)
Month with Nike 0.0001 –0.0003
  (0.0001) (0.0002)
Nike Percentage 0.041** –0.027
  (0.019) (0.016)
Apparel 0.021 0.012
  (0.017) (0.018)
Footwear 0.073*** 0.102****
  (0.032) (0.032)
Year 2003 0.029 0.031 0.046**
  (0.018) (0.02) (0.021)
Year 2004 0.046** 0.056*** 0.066***
  (0.02) (0.023) (0.025)
Constant 0.63**** 0.616**** 0.72**** 0.69****
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.057) (0.064)
Region Random Effect:
Std(const) 0.074 0.07 0.083 0.080
Std(residual) 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
Observations 568 463 355 355
Number of Groups 4 4 4 4
Chi2 37.72**** 33.14**** 53.12**** 57.74****
Log-Restricted Likelihood 301.1 245.4 201.7 181.5
Appendix 4
Explaining the Variation in First M-Audit Scores:  Hierarchical Models
In this appendix, we present the regression results for First M-Audit scores in hierarchical settings.  We use two-level 
KLHUDUFKLFDOPRGHOVZLWKIDFWRU\DVWKHÀUVWOHYHODQGUHJLRQDVWKHVHFRQG7KHUHJUHVVLRQUHVXOWVDUHYHU\VLPLODUWRWKRVH
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Appendix 5
In this appendix, we present the regressions of two M-Audit items—wages and work hours—on selected variables 
to determine whether there are differences between our analyses using the composite M-Audit with its constituent 
items.  Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4.  We still find a statistically significant 
positive correlation between the country-level macro variable and M-Audit sub-scores.  Factory size is still negatively 
related to sub-scores.  Strategic Partners is statistically significant, but less robust.  Nike percentage is negatively 
related to sub-M-Audit scores.  There is one interesting contrast between wages and work hours:  the log number of 
employees has a highly statistically significant negative relationship with hours but no association with wages.
Table A5
Results of Regressing M-Audit Sub-Scores on Selected Variables
Variable Wage Standard Hours Standard
Index of Economic Freedom –0.0722*** –0.09***
(0.025) (0.03)
(log) Number of Employees –0.013 –0.061****
(0.01) (0.01)
Ownership –0.002 0.004
(0.026) (0.03)
Shape Visit –0.00079 –0.000002
(0.003) (0.004)
Strategic 0.028 0.09**
(0.03) (0.04)
Month with Nike –0.00012 0.00055
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Nike Percentage –0.105*** –0.146***
(0.041) (0.05)
Apparel 0.032 0.0006
(0.029) (0.04)
Footwear 0.15*** 0.254****
(0.05) (0.068)
Year 2003 0.003 0.035
(0.036) (0.045)
Year 2004 0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Constant 1.02**** 1.17****
(0.07) (0.09)
Observations 355 355
R Square 0.11 0.21
30 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
REFERENCES
Amsden, Alice H.  1989.  Asia’s Next Giant:  South Korea 
and Late Industrialization.  New York:  Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Baccaro, Lucio.  2001.  Civil Society, NGOs, and Decent 
Work Policies:  Sorting out the Issues.  International La-
bor Organization (International Institute for Labour 
Studies).  Available at http://www.ilo.org/public/eng-
lish/bureau/inst/download/dp12701.pdf.
Bartley, Tim.  2005.  “Corporate Accountability and 
the Privatization of Labor Standards:  Struggles over 
Codes of Conduct in the Apparel Industry.”  In Har-
land Prechel, ed., Politics and the Corporation, Vol. 14 
(Research in Political Sociology), pp. 211–44.  Greenwich, 
Conn.:  JAI Press.
Brown, Dana L.  2005a.  “Challenges and Opportunities 
for the Fair Labor Association in the Post-MFA Period.” 
Prepared under the supervision of Professor Richard 
Locke for The Fair Labor Association (FLA) Strategic 
Planning Meeting, July 26–27, at MIT Sloan School of 
Management, Cambridge, Mass.
____.  2005b.  “Cooperation without Trust?  Reflections 
on the FLA’s Efforts to Promote Collaboration among 
Its Members and with Other MSIs.”  Prepared under 
the supervision of Professor Richard Locke for The 
Fair Labor Association (FLA) Strategic Planning Meet-
ing, July 26–27, at MIT Sloan School of Management, 
Cambridge, Mass.
Christensen, C. Roland, and David C. Rikert.  1984. 
“Nike (A).”  Harvard Business School Case, No. 9-385-025 
(Oct. 16), pp. 1–31.
Cole, Robert E.  1999.  “Market Pressures and Institutional 
Forces:  The Early Years of the Quality Movement.”  In 
Robert E. Cole and W. Richard Scott, eds., The Quality 
Movement and Organizational Theory, pp. 67–88.  Thou-
sand Oaks, Calif.:  Sage.
Collier, Paul, and David Dollar.  2002.  Globalization, 
Growth, and Poverty:  Building an Inclusive World Economy. 
Washington, D.C.:  World Bank/Oxford University 
Press.
Connor, Tim, and Kelly Dent.  2006.  Offside! Labor Rights 
and Sportswear Production in Asia.  (Last Updated:  May 
2006.)  Oxfam International.  Available at http://
www.oxfam.org/en/policy/briefingnotes/offside_la-
bor_report/.
Dobbin, Frank, and John R. Sutton.  1998.  “The Strength 
of a Weak State:  The Rights Revolution and the Rise 
of Human Resources Management Divisions.”  Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, Vol. 104, No. 2 (September), 
pp. 441–76.
Eckstein, Harry.  1991.  “Case Study and Theory in 
Political Science.”  In Harry Eckstein, ed., Regarding 
Politics:  Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change, pp. 
117–76.  Berkeley:  University of California Press.
Elliott, Kimberly Ann, and Richard B. Freeman.  2003. 
Can Standards Improve under Globalization?  Washington, 
D.C.:  Institute for International Economics.
Esbenshade, Jill.  2004.  Monitoring Sweatshops:  Workers, 
Consumers, and the Global Apparel Industry.  Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press.
Frenkel, Stephen J., and Duncan Scott.  2002.  “Compli-
ance, Collaboration, and Codes of Labor Practice:  The 
Adidas Connection.”  California Management Review,
Vol. 45, No. 1 (Fall), pp. 29–49.
Fung, Archon, Dara O’Rourke, and Charles F. Sable. 
2001.  Can We Put an End to Sweatshops? A New Democ-
racy Forum on Raising Global Labor Standards.  Boston: 
Beacon Press.
Jenkins, Rhys.  2001.  Corporate Codes of Conduct:  Self-
Regulation in a Global Economy.  (Last Updated:  April 
2001.)  United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD).  Available at http://www.
eldis.org/static/DOC9199.htm.
Kane, Tim, Kim R. Holmes, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady. 
2007.  2007 Index of Economic Freedom:  The Link Be-
tween Economic Opportunity and Prosperity.  Heritage 
Foundation.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastru-
zzi.  2004.  Governance Matters III:  Governance Research 
Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS), 1996–2002.  (Last 
Updated:  April 5, 2004.)  The World Bank.  Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/
govmatters3.html.
Kochan, Thomas A., Harry C. Katz, and Robert B. McK-
ersie.  1986.  The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations.  New York:  Basic Books.
Korzeniewicz, Miguel.  1994.  “Commodity Chains and 
Marketing Strategies:  Nike and the Global Athletic 
Footwear Industry.”  In Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korze-
niewicz, eds., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism,
pp. 247–66.  Westport, Conn.:  Greenwood.
Locke, Richard M.  2003.  “The Promise and Perils of 
Globalization:  The Case of Nike, Inc.”  In Thomas 
A. Kochan and Richard Schmalensee, eds., Manage-
ment:  Inventing and Delivering Its Future, pp. 39–70. 
Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT Press.
Locke, Richard M., and Monica Romis.  2007.  “Improv-
ing Work Conditions in a Global Supply Chain.”  MIT 
Sloan Management Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Winter), pp. 
54–62.
Mamic, Ivanka.  2004.  Implementing Codes of Conduct: 
How Businesses Manage Social Performance in Global Supply 
Chains.  Geneva:  International Labor Organization.
Moran, Theodore H.  2002.  Beyond Sweatshops:  Foreign 
Direct Investment and Globalization in Developing Countries. 
Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution Press.
Murakami, Yasusuke.  1987.  “The Japanese Model of 
Political Economy.”  In Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi 
Yasuba, eds., The Political Economy of Japan:  The Domestic 
Transformation, Vol. 1, pp. 33–90.  Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press.
Nadvi, Khalid, and Frank Wältring.  2004.  “Making Sense 
of Global Standards.”  In Hubert Schmitz, ed., Local 
Enterprises in the Global Economy:  Issues of Governance and 
Upgrading.  Northampton:  Edward Elgar.
National Research Council.  2004.  Monitoring Internation-
al Labor Standards:  Techniques and Sources of Information. 
Washington, D.C.:  National Academies Press.
National Sporting Goods Association.  2005.  Available 
at www.sbrnet.com.
Nike, Inc.  2005.  FY04 Corporate Responsibility Report.  (Last 
Updated:  March 2005.)  Beaverton, Ore.:  Nike, Inc. 
Available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.
MONITORING AND LABOR STANDARDS AT NIKE 31
jhtml?page=29&item=fy04.
O’Rourke, Dara.  2003.  “Outsourcing Regulation:  Ana-
lyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards 
and Monitoring.”  Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 31, No. 1 
(February), pp. 1–30.
Petrecca, Laura, and Theresa Howard.  2005.  “Adidas-
Reebok Merger Lets Rivals Nip at Nike’s Heels.”  USA 
Today, August 4, p. B1.
Piore, Michael J.  2005.  “Looking for Flexible Workplace 
Regulation in Latin America and the United States.” 
Conference paper for Workshop on Labour Standards 
Application:  A Compared Perspective, November 
28–30, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Piore, Michael J., and Charles F. Sable.  1984.  The Second 
Industrial Divide:  Possibilities for Prosperity.  New York: 
Basic Books.
Pruett, Duncan.  2005.  Looking for a Quick Fix:  How 
Weak Social Auditing Is Keeping Workers in Sweatshops. 
(Last Updated:  November 2005.)  Clean Clothes 
Campaign.  Available at http://www.cleanclothes.
org/ftp/05-quick_fix.pdf.
Rodriguez-Garavito, Cesar A.  2005.  “Global Governance 
and Labor Rights:  Codes of Conduct and Anti-Sweat-
shop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in Mexico 
and Guatemala.”  Politics and Society, Vol. 33, No. 2 
(June 1), pp. 203–33.
Rosenzweig, Philip M.  1994.  “International Sourcing in 
Athletic Footwear:  Nike and Reebok.”  Harvard Business 
School Case, No. 9-394-189 (July 14), pp. 1–17.
Sable, Charles F.  1994.  “Learning by Monitoring:  The 
Institutions of Economic Development.”  In Neil J. 
Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of 
Economic Sociology, pp. 137–65.  Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press.
Schrage, Elliot J.  2004.  Promoting International Worker 
Rights through Private Voluntary Initiatives:  Public Rela-
tions or Public Policy?  (Last Updated:  January 2004.) 
University of Iowa Center for Human Rights (UICHR). 
Available at http://www.uiowa.edu/~uichr/publica-
tions/documents/gwri_report_000.pdf.
Schrank, Andrew.  2005.  “Professionalization and Probity 
in the Predatory State:  Labor Law Enforcement in the 
Dominican Republic.”  Paper presented for the MIT 
Institute for Work and Employment Relations Seminar, 
February 8, Cambridge, Mass.
Seidman, Gay W.  2003.  “Monitoring Multinationals: 
Lessons from the Anti-Apartheid Era.”  Politics & Society,
Vol. 31, No. 3 (September), pp. 381–406.
Shiba, Shoji, Alan Graham, and David Walden.  1993.  A
New American TQM:  Four Practical Revolutions in Manage-
ment.  Cambridge:  Productivity Press, Inc.
Smith, Gare, and Dan Feldman.  2003.  Company Codes 
of Conduct and International Standards:  An Analytical 
Comparison.  Part I of II:  Apparel, Footware and Light 
Manufacturing; Agribusiness; Tourism.  (Last Updated: 
October 2003.)  The World Bank.  Available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSD/Resources/
CSR/Company_Codes_of_Conduct.pdf.
Strasser, J. B., and Laurie Becklund.  1991.  Swoosh:  The 
Unauthorized Story of Nike and the Men Who Played There. 
San Diego:  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Verité.  2004.  Excessive Overtime in Chinese Supplier Factories: 
Causes, Impacts, and Recommendations for Action.  (Last 
Updated:  September 7, 2004.)  Verité.  Available at 
http://www.verite.org/news/Excessiveovertime.
Weick, Karl E.  1999.  “Quality Improvement:  A Sense-
making Perspective.”  In Robert E. Cole and W. Richard 
Scott, eds., The Quality Movement and Organizational 
Theory, pp. 155–75.  Thousand Oaks, Calif.:  Sage.
Weil, David.  1991.  “Enforcing OSHA:  The Role of 
Labor Unions.”  Industrial Relations, Vol. 30, No. 1 
(Winter), pp. 20–36.
____.  1996.  “If OSHA Is So Bad, Why Is Compliance 
So Good?”  RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 3
(Autumn), pp. 618–40.
____.  2005.  “Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: 
Evaluating a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum 
Wage.”  Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 58, 
No. 2 (January), pp. 238–57.
Zadek, Simon.  2004.  “The Path to Corporate Respon-
sibility.”  Harvard Business Review, Vol. 82, No. 12 (Dec. 
1), pp. 125–32.
